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Promoting Marriage Experimentation: A Class Act? 
Julie Nice* 
As far as poor people are concerned, policy experimentation leads 
and knowledge follows, typically after a considerable lag in time and 
with far less fanfare. Subjecting welfare recipients to the vagaries of 
policy whims and experimental research is neither new nor, 
apparently, unconstitutional.1 The federal welfare system has used 
recipients for policy experimentation indirectly by granting waivers 
allowing states to depart from compliance with federal rules, and 
directly by conducting federal experimentation. The last decade of 
federal welfare reform has produced a windfall of funding for social 
science research, especially for studies focusing on whether and how 
recipients move from welfare to work. More recently, the federal 
government has funded a new wave of programs designed to reshape 
the family structure of impoverished parents and children. The 
centerpiece of this new focus on the family is the Bush 
Administration’s initiative to promote marriage.  
This Article considers both the new marriage promotion policies 
and related social science research. The key question about marriage 
promotion concerns the link between welfare policy and social 
science data, specifically focusing on what policymakers will learn 
 
 * Delaney Professor of Law, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. I especially 
thank Professor Susan Appleton for coordinating this symposium, and also all the participants 
at the Oxford Women's Rights Roundtable in March 2006 and the Law and Society Association 
panel in Baltimore in July 2006, where I presented versions of this paper. 
 1. Current constitutional interpretation effectively allows this human experimentation by 
affording poor people only the lowest level of constitutional protection. Because the Supreme 
Court has not held that poor people are a suspect class, or that socioeconomic class is a suspect 
classification, or that subsistence is a fundamental right, courts apply a rational basis review, 
which requires merely that a welfare policy be rationally related to some legitimate 
governmental interest. As the Court explained, “the intractable economic, social, and even 
philosophical problems presented by public welfare assistance programs are not the business of 
this Court.” Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970). 
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from emerging data generated by this grand experimentation with the 
lives of poor families.  
MARRIAGE PROMOTION POLICY 
The federal government recently reversed its nearly sixty-year-old 
federal policy of preventing or discouraging receipt of welfare 
benefits by two-parent families, replacing this prior marriage penalty 
with new policies to promote marriage.2 In short, the federal 
government’s policy has shifted from effectively discouraging 
marriage for welfare recipients to affirmatively promoting marriage.  
Marriage myths abound, but few survive scrutiny. First, while the 
conventional view of marriage situates it in the so-called private 
sphere, scholars have demonstrated the unquestionably public 
character of marriage.3 As the late philosopher Susan Moller Okin 
 
 2.  THEODORA OOMS ET AL., CTR. FOR LAW & SOC. POLICY, BEYOND MARRIAGE 
LICENSES: EFFORTS IN STATES TO STRENGTHEN MARRIAGE AND TWO-PARENT FAMILIES 7 
(2004), available at http://www.clasp.org/publications/beyond_marr.pdf. 
 3. A funny thing happened on my way to present a version of this paper at the Oxford 
Women's Rights Roundtable, raising a question about the extent of a scholarly consensus on the 
public role of marriage. Wanting a small memento from the shelves of the Oxford University 
Press bookstore, I picked up a copy of DAVID MILLER, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: A VERY SHORT 
INTRODUCTION (2003). Imagine my surprise to see the profound insights of feminist 
scholarship treated as not properly “political” by one of our most prominent contemporary 
political theorists. See id. at 95. Professor Miller acknowledges the historical record of men 
exercising power over women by keeping them economically dependent, but he insists it does 
not follow that we should think of relations between the sexes as political. He argues bluntly: 
“What feminists are pointing out about relationships between men and women is not so much 
their inherently political nature as the failure of politics to address them.” Id. at 97. Miller then 
defines freedom as “having a range of options open to one, but also having the capacity to 
choose between them.” Id. at 98. While admitting that most women suffer from limited options, 
he argues that the internal capacity to choose remains the more difficult issue, as this question 
of internal capacity “becomes entangled with another question that feminists themselves 
disagree about: whether men and women have essentially a common nature, or whether there 
are deep differences between them which mean that there will always be contrasts in the way 
that men and women prefer to lead their lives.” Id. at 99. Miller adds that “we should not be too 
quick to assume that when women choose to follow certain cultural norms, these choices are 
inauthentic.” Id. On whether women have a different nature regarding internal capacity to 
choose, Miller punts the question, arguing that “the wisest course may be to follow John Stuart 
Mill and remain agnostic.” Id. 
 Miller acknowledges the argument of the ongoing inequality between the sexes in the 
domestic sphere: “[W]ithout domestic justice, social justice is never going to be achieved for 
women.” Id. at 106. Yet again, Miller refuses to pull his punch, responding, “[W]e should not 
be too quick to conclude that because men and women end up unequally placed in certain 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol24/iss1/4
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once succinctly put it, “The issue is not whether, but how the state 
intervenes.”4 Two prominent scholars, historian Nancy Cott5 and 
family analyst Stephanie Coontz,6 separately presented exhaustive 
documentation of the government’s extensive regulation of marriage 
for various public policy purposes. 
Second, marriage scholars have debunked the myth that states are 
the appropriate governmental regulators of marriage. As Cott 
recounted, the federal government vigorously used marriage for its 
regulatory goals, such as enforcing Christian norms of monogamy on 
Native Americans, newly freed slaves, and Mormons, among others.7 
Governmental regulation of the marriages and family lives of poor 
people certainly has been ubiquitous throughout American history.8 
Third, marriage is often glorified as an established, static, 
traditional institution. Yet Cott traced the consistently dynamic nature 
of marriage, revealing how the government has adapted its regulation 
of marriage for various public policy purposes throughout the 
eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries.9 Coontz also pointed 
 
respects, this must be an injustice. After all some unequal outcomes are none the less fair—for 
instance when they reflect the different choices people have made.” Id. at 107. On this question, 
Miller seems decidedly less agnostic about the role of nature, arguing that once social norms 
about women’s roles have disappeared, “the principle of free agreement will come into its 
own.” Id. at 108. He surmises that, to the extent it is true that women’s maternal nature makes 
them different from men, then “fairness in domestic relations ought to be compatible with 
flexibility in family life, where partners can choose to divide up work inside and outside the 
home according to their individual preferences and abilities.” Id. 
 Although Miller cites to the prominent feminist theorists Carole Pateman and Susan Moller 
Okin, he fails or refuses to incorporate their foundational insights. Carole Pateman provided a 
powerful expose of how sexual subordination of women is constitutive of liberalism’s social 
contract theory. See, e.g., CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT (1988). Susan Moller 
Okin argued, based on the very precepts of social contract theory, that it was inexplicable and 
inexcusable for theories of justice to neglect how and why women are treated differently from 
men and how this begins in the family. See, e.g., SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND 
THE FAMILY (1989). 
 4. OKIN, supra note 3, at 131; see also Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention 
in the Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 835, 836 (1985).  
 5. See NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 
(2000). 
 6. See STEPHANIE COONTZ, MARRIAGE, A HISTORY: FROM OBEDIENCE TO INTIMACY OR 
HOW LOVE CONQUERED MARRIAGE (2005). 
 7. COTT, supra note 5, at 24–66. 
 8. See id. at 171–79, 221–24. See generally LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: 
SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE HISTORY OF WELFARE 1890–1935 (1994). 
 9. COTT, supra note 5, at 2, 157. 
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out that these changes have not developed in a linear direction. She 
concluded, “Almost every marital and sexual arrangement we have 
seen in recent years, however startling it may appear, has been tried 
somewhere before.”10 
Given the longstanding history of active governmental regulation 
of marriage and family policy, it should come as no surprise that the 
federal government appears to have great faith in the efficacy of its 
initiative to promote marriage. In its overhaul of welfare in the 1996 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, 
Congress gave states broad flexibility to meet four primary purposes, 
three of which relate to marriage promotion:  
(1) [to] provide assistance to needy families so that children 
may be cared for in their own homes or in the homes of 
relatives;  
(2) [to] end the dependence of needy parents on government 
benefits by promoting job preparation, work, and marriage;  
(3) [to] prevent and reduce the incidence of out-of-wedlock 
pregnancies . . . ; and  
(4) [to] encourage the formation and maintenance of two-
parent families.11 
According to an analysis by the Center for Law and Social Policy, 
every state has made at least one policy change to promote marriage 
in the last decade.12 Thirty-six states have eliminated barriers 
previously imposed on two-parent families seeking welfare benefits 
and now treat them the same as single-parent families.13 Forty states 
now offer government-funded programs to promote marriage.14 
Notably, only nine states offer any financial incentive or “bonus” for 
recipients who marry.15 In fact, the major initiatives receiving 
significant funding are various advertising and educational programs 
 
 10. COONTZ, supra note 6, at 2. 
 11. 42 U.S.C. § 601(a) (2000). 
 12. OOMS ET AL., supra note 2, at 10. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 11. 
 15. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol24/iss1/4
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designed to encourage couples to marry and to stay together, which 
especially target adult couples, high school students, and low-income 
parents.16 
The Bush Administration bolstered these state efforts by declaring 
that the promotion of “healthy” marriages would be a top priority for 
reauthorization of the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
(TANF) program and also by providing various sources of federal 
funding to states for marriage promotion.17 Administration officials 
pledged $1.5 billion to support Bush’s healthy marriage initiative.18 
Moreover, the President made no secret of his desire to link marriage 
promotion with his faith-based initiative to involve more religious 
organizations in providing social services.19  
When Congress replaced Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children with TANF in 1996, it scheduled reauthorization by 2001. 
Rather than address the tricky politics inherent in comprehensive 
review and reform, Congress repeatedly extended TANF for 
temporary intervals from 2001 through 2005. At the end of 2005, the 
House of Representatives and Senate finally enacted a budget 
reconciliation conference agreement that effectively reauthorized 
TANF20 in this Deficit Reduction Act of 2005. The Deficit Reduction 
Act mandated the imposition of penalties against states that fail to 
enforce the thirty-five-hour weekly work requirement on at least 90% 
of two-parent families.21 This 90% work rate for two-parent families 
 
 16. Id. at 17. 
 17. See Press Release, White House, Working Toward Independence (Feb. 2002), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/welfare-reform-announcement-
book.html. 
 18. Robert Pear & David D. Kirkpatrick, Bush Plans $1.5 Billion Drive for Promotion of 
Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2004, at A1. 
 19. See George W. Bush, President, U.S. Remarks at St. Luke’s Catholic Church (Feb. 26, 
2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020226-11.html. The 
Bush administration’s Healthy Marriage Initiative features a fact sheet highlighting faith-based 
marriage promotion activities offered by the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services’ 
Administration for Children & Families. See ACF Health Marriage Initiative, Faith-Based 
Marriage Promotion and Education, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/healthymarriage/about/factsheets 
_faithbased.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2007). 
 20. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Welfare Reform 
Reauthorized (Feb. 8, 2006), available at http://www.dhhs.gov/news/press/2006pres/20060208. 
html. 
 21. SHARON PARROTT, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, DESPITE INCLUSION OF 
“MARRIAGE-PROMOTION” FUNDING, BUDGET BILL WOULD PENALIZE STATES THAT PROVIDE 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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compares to a far more lenient 50% work rate for TANF families 
generally.22 Congress further mandated that the 90% two-parent work 
rate must apply to state programs that are funded entirely with state 
funds, eliminating the prior loophole for states to evade federal 
penalties.23  
The more stringent two-parent work rate effectively restores the 
prior marriage penalty, which cannot be justified by assuming that 
two-parent families would have an easier time meeting the work 
requirement. State governmental officials have reported that two-
parent families face barriers and challenges to work as great or 
greater than those experienced by single parents.24 For example, 
some two-parent impoverished families include one disabled parent 
with the other parent providing critical care.25 According to the 
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, most experts, including 
researchers, state officials, and even the Bush Administration, 
opposed the 90% two-parent work rate precisely because they 
believed it would be virtually impossible for even the best state 
programs to meet.26 
Judging by its effect, restoration of the welfare marriage penalty 
appears to be a cost-cutting measure. Indeed, the marriage promotion 
funds generally are not used to directly increase the income of 
impoverished two-parent or married-parent families.27 This is 
especially ironic considering that the same federal legislation 
restoring the welfare marriage penalty also provided substantial new 
funding for marriage promotion. 
 
TANF ASSISTANCE TO POOR MARRIED FAMILIES (2006), available at http://www.cbpp.org/1-
31-06+anf.pdf. 
 22. Id. at 2.  
 23. Id. at 4. 
 24. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WELFARE REFORM: WITH TANF FLEXIBILITY, 
STATES VARY IN HOW THEY IMPLEMENT WORK REQUIREMENTS AND TIME LIMITS 19–20 
(2002). 
 25. PARROTT, supra note 21, at 6. 
 26. Id. at 4 (“Researchers and state officials have long noted that even the best-run, high-
performing state programs cannot meet a 90-percent participation rate because there are 
numerous legitimate reasons why more than 10 percent of these families cannot attend every 
hour of scheduled activities every week of every month . . . a 90-percent participation rate is 
widely understood to be unattainable.”). 
 27. OOMS ET AL., supra note 2, at 11, 16. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol24/iss1/4
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The new marriage promotion funds primarily have funded the 
relatively cheaper marketing and educational programs designed to 
encourage poor Americans to marry and to stay married.28 Here, the 
irony is that the funding of a “public relations” campaign to promote 
marriage turns out to be entirely unnecessary. A recent longitudinal 
study of 162 low-income single mothers revealed that single mothers 
repeatedly express both their reverence for the institution of marriage 
and their aspiration to be married one day.29 Sociologists Kathryn 
Edin and Maria Kefalas demonstrated that the problem is not that 
poor women do not revere or aspire to marry, but rather that they 
delay or avoid marriage because they see it as a “luxury” they cannot 
afford.30 In contrast, poor women do not delay having children 
because they see children as a “necessity” for their senses of identity 
and meaning.31 Thus, as currently structured, marriage promotion 
policies simply fail to speak to the reality of poor women’s lives. 
Poor women have placed marriage on a pedestal; marriage might be 
over-romanticized as the prize at the end of the personal 
responsibility road.  
The myth of marriage is that it always has been an institution that 
serves as the ultimate fulfillment of romantic love. In her synthesis of 
historical materials, Stephanie Coontz convincingly refuted this 
myth, revealing instead that marriage primarily has been about 
property and class. As Coontz summarized: 
For centuries, marriage did much of the work that markets and 
governments do today. It organized the production and 
distribution of goods and people. It set up political, economic, 
and military alliances. It coordinated the division of labor by 
gender and age. It orchestrated people’s personal rights and 
obligations in everything from sexual relations to the 
inheritance of property. Most societies had very specific rules 
 
 28. Id. at 15, 18. 
 29. KATHRYN EDIN & MARIA KEFALAS, PROMISES I CAN KEEP: WHY POOR WOMEN PUT 
MOTHERHOOD BEFORE MARRIAGE 6 (2005). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
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about how people should arrange their marriages to accomplish 
these tasks.32 
Regarding today’s marriage promotion policies, Coontz agreed 
with Edin and Kefalas’s finding that low-income men and women 
“are much more likely to view marriage as the preferred state, but 
they are also less likely to get married.”33 In Coontz’s analysis, the 
real barrier to marriage for low-income women is that it is risky:  
A woman who marries a man with few job prospects may end 
up having to support him as well as their children. Even if the 
marriage does improve her economic well-being, its stability 
may be undermined by chronic economic and neighborhood 
stress. Low-income women who marry and divorce later have 
higher poverty rates than women who never marry at all, and 
their children may suffer more emotionally as well. In these 
circumstances, getting married can be risky. Impoverished 
women understand these risks better than many of the marriage 
promoters trying to convince them of the benefits of 
marriage.34 
While poor women may hold their own views of both the 
romantic ideal and the realistic risk of marriage, a policy analysis 
necessarily turns on what the social science data demonstrate about 
the relationship between marriage and poverty.  
SOCIAL SCIENCE DATA REGARDING MARRIAGE AND POVERTY 
Policymakers and researchers across the political spectrum have 
framed the decline of marriage as a public policy problem and a 
social crisis. Consider the following statements from some prominent 
policy analysts. The conservative Heritage Foundation boldly asserts 
that the “erosion of the institution of marriage over the past four 
decades has had large-scale negative effects on children and adults 
and lies at the heart of many social problems with which government 
 
 32. COONTZ, supra note 6, at 9. 
 33. Id. at 287. 
 34. Id. at 288. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol24/iss1/4
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is currently grappling.”35 The liberal Center for Law and Social 
Policy focuses on its “Marriage-Plus” platform: “1) to help more 
children grow up in healthy, married families, and 2) when this isn’t 
possible, to help parents—whether unmarried, separated, divorced, or 
remarried—cooperate better in raising their children.”36 Some 
independent scholars apparently agree, as exemplified by the recent 
conclusion from Sara McLanahan and Elisabeth Donahue of 
Princeton University and Ron Haskins of the Brookings Institution: 
“There seems to be nearly universal agreement, based on years of 
research, that lone-parent child rearing imposes serious costs on 
individuals and society.”37 
The decline of marriage is blamed for a myriad of social 
problems, and many analysts cite a link between marriage and 
poverty as foundational for building public policy. The Heritage 
Foundation uses the language of causation in its assertion that the 
“collapse of marriage is the principal cause of child poverty in the 
United States.”38 Sara McLanahan and her fellow researchers for the 
Fragile Families longitudinal study are more cautious, describing the 
correlation between marriage and poverty as one of disproportionate 
risk: unmarried parents and their children face “a higher risk of 
poverty and family dissolution than traditional families.”39 Whether 
framed as cause or correlation, this link between marriage and 
poverty is now the focus of over eighty million dollars in government 
contracts to study the effectiveness of programs designed to 
encourage impoverished couples to choose marriage and to avoid 
divorce.40  
 
 35. ROBERT RECTOR, HERITAGE FOUND., MARRIAGE PROMOTION (2006), available at 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/features/issues/pdfs/MarriagePromotion.pdf. 
 36. PAULA ROBERTS, CTR. FOR LAW & SOC. POLICY, BUILDING BRIDGES BETWEEN THE 
HEALTHY MARRIAGE, RESPONSIBLE FATHERHOOD, AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE MOVEMENTS: 
ISSUES, CONCERNS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1 (2006), available at http://www.clasp.org/ 
publications/buildingbridges_brief7.pdf. 
37. RON HASKINS ET AL., THE DECLINE IN MARRIAGE: WHAT TO DO 7 (2005), available 
at http://www.futureofchildren.princeton.edu/briefs/briefs/05_fall_marriage.pdf. 
 38. PATRICK F. FAGAN, HERITAGE FOUND., MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY 9 (2006), 
available at http://www.heritage.org/Research/Features/issues/Issuearea/Family.cfm. 
 39. SARA MCLANAHAN ET AL., THE FRAGILE FAMILIES AND CHILD WELLBEING STUDY, 
BASELINE NATIONAL REPORT 1 (2003), available at http://www.fragilefamilies.princeton.edu/ 
documents/nationalreport.pdf.  
 40. HASKINS ET AL., supra note 37, at 3. 
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Does social science data support a causal or correlative link 
between marriage and poverty? The greatest challenge with regard to 
evaluating existing research is that much of it suffers from the failure 
to control for selectivity from omitted variables and reverse 
causality.41 While the most probative longitudinal studies are 
ongoing, recent reviews synthesizing available social science data 
reveal both serious limitations in the data itself as well as critical gaps 
in knowledge.  
Research analyst David Ribar critically reviewed the body of data 
related to the benefits of marriage, finding strengths and weaknesses 
in each empirical methodology. For example, Ribar found that the 
research purporting to show that marriage is associated with better 
outcomes for children is “based mainly on analyses that failed to 
account for selectivity,” that is, excluding variables relating to other 
family characteristics or circumstances.42 Ribar also determined that 
the research purporting to show that marriage is associated with 
positive physical health benefits “still has to be judged to be 
methodology weak” and therefore “its findings have to be interpreted 
with a fair degree of caution.”43 Ribar recognizes one exception to his 
overall caveat about the limitations for drawing conclusions from 
research to date, and it relates to interpersonal interactions between 
spouses: “The research on marital interactions, as opposed to 
marriage status and family structure, contains more solid evidence of 
a causal link to health outcomes.”44 Ribar therefore concludes that 
 
 41. DAVID C. RIBAR, WHAT DO SOCIAL SCIENTISTS KNOW ABOUT THE BENEFITS OF 
MARRIAGE? A REVIEW OF QUANTITATIVE METHODOLOGIES, at iv (2004). Ribar states:  
Marriage is positively associated with a large number of outcomes including improved 
cognitive, emotional and physical well-being for children, better mental and physical 
health for adults, and greater earnings and consumption for family members. While the 
associations between marriage and various measures of well-being have been 
convincingly established, they do not, by themselves, make a compelling case that 
marriage has beneficial effects. As with many other types of social science data, the 
empirical relationships are likely to be confounded by problems of reverse causality 
and spurious correlation from omitted variables. Because of this, we cannot be sure 
whether the observed relationships reflect marriage making people better off, better-off 
people being more likely to marry, or some combination of the two. 
Id. 
 42. Id. at 30.  
 43. Id. at 52. 
 44. Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol24/iss1/4
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this research generally supports the Bush Administration’s emphasis 
on programs that improve relationship skills and interactions.45 He 
also offers an optimistic observation regarding the whole body of 
research, concluding that potential benefits from “cross-pollination” 
of insights among the various studies would increase the usefulness 
of the data.46 
Another overview of the available social science research, 
conducted by researchers with Abt Associates led by David Fein, 
highlighted troubling gaps in knowledge based on their review and 
synthesis of existing data regarding marriage and poverty.47 
Emphasizing the multiple factors affecting marriage and cohabitation, 
this team categorized the various influences into four primary types: 
(1) demographic, (2) economic, (3) socio-cultural, and (4) 
psychological.48 Based on weaknesses in the current data, they called 
for further research on important questions related to each of these 
types of influences.49 
Regarding demographic influences, the report revealed serious 
gaps in knowledge about (1) why early and non-marital childbearing 
“substantially diminished long-term marriage prospects”; (2) why 
parents who marry nonetheless experience a decline in marital quality 
during the first two years following birth; and (3) why the increase in 
cohabitation does not appear to have increased the likelihood of 
marital disruption.50  
The data provide mixed indicators regarding economic influences 
and therefore do not yet answer two important questions: (1) whether 
increased employment among low-income women causes fewer 
women to marry, and (2) why improving men’s economic status, 
which does correlate positively with becoming and staying married, 
 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 58. Ribar’s conclusions are confirmed by other analysts. See, e.g., DAVID FEIN 
& THEODORA OOMS, CTR. FOR LAW & SOC. POLICY, WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT COUPLES 
AND MARRIAGE IN DISADVANTAGED POPULATIONS? REFLECTIONS FROM A RESEARCHER AND 
A POLICY ANALYST 27 (2006). 
 47. See DAVID J. FEIN ET AL., THE DETERMINANTS OF MARRIAGE AND COHABITATION 
AMONG DISADVANTAGED AMERICANS: RESEARCH FINDINGS AND NEEDS, (2003), available at 
http://www.abtassociates.com/reports/litrev_abt.pdf. 
 48. Id. at iii.  
 49. Id.  
 50. Id. at iii–v. 
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does “not explain very much of the variation in marriage at any given 
time, over time, or across racial and ethnic groups.”51 
The report calls for studies to explore why poor people set high 
financial and relational expectations for marriage, and why traditional 
gender role expectations correlate to marriage while egalitarian 
expectations correlate to cohabitation.52 These specific questions also 
trigger the broader inquiry of whether public policy can influence 
how couples adapt their families to changing cultural norms. 
Finally, regarding psychological influences, studies of white 
middle-class couples have shown a strong correlation between 
positive interpersonal interactions and marital success.53 Researchers 
do not yet know whether these results will be replicated for diverse, 
low-income populations.54 Moreover, very little data exist explaining 
how demographic and personality characteristics relate to couple 
interaction, or how various environmental stresses influence this 
interaction.55 
Fein and his colleagues provide a succinct summary of what 
researchers need to accomplish to improve knowledge about marriage 
and poverty. Their recommendations call for more and better 
information regarding disadvantaged populations, including men and 
women, in varied types of unions, both at the onset of the relationship 
and longitudinally.56 They underscore the need for standard 
definitions for key measurements such as “union quality,” and also 
for better methods of establishing causation.57 Finally, they 
emphasize the need for data comparing influences across cohorts, and 
also analyzing interactions between influences.58 
Regardless of the need for caution regarding the limitations of 
data and gaps in knowledge, government funding of experimentation 
with the family lives of poor people continues, especially for 
“marriage education” programs. These programs emerged from the 
 
 51. Id. at v. 
 52. Id. at vi. 
 53. Id. at vi–vii. 
 54. Id. at vii–viii. 
 55. Id. at vi–vii. 
 56. Id. at viii–ix. 
 57. Id. at ix–x. 
 58. Id. at viii–x. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol24/iss1/4
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research finding that higher quality interpersonal interactions of 
white, middle-class couples increase the longevity of the 
relationship.59 Considering how this finding regarding quality of 
marital interactions might apply to racially diverse, low-income 
couples, Fein succinctly admits: “we have no idea whether the data 
apply to other ethnic or income groups.”60  
To answer this question, the federal government has funded two 
major longitudinal research experiments to analyze marriage 
education programs for low-income couples. Supporting Healthy 
Marriage is being evaluated by MDRC to study the effect of marriage 
education in helping low-income married parents stay married. In an 
initial report from this study, Fein, the lead researcher, concluded that 
the “weight of evidence suggests that marital quality is at most only 
slightly lower for poor couples than for more advantaged ones” and 
surmised that this finding “should alleviate worries that vast numbers 
of disadvantaged couples are too distressed to benefit from 
prevention-oriented marriage skills programs.”61  
The other major federally funded study is Building Strong 
Families, being evaluated by Mathematica Policy Research, Inc., and 
focusing on increasing marriage among unwed couples who are new 
parents or expecting a child. An early report from this study found 
that participants in marriage education programs expressed their 
beliefs that the group workshops helped them with communication, 
problem solving, conflict management, self-understanding, and 
connection and commitment to their partner.62 
Another specific area of caution relates to the intersection of class 
with other traits such as race and sexual orientation. On the one hand, 
some prevalent stereotypes about the decline of marriage among poor 
people may reflect a conflation of low-income couples with racial 
 
 59. OOMS ET AL., supra note 2, at 13, 17. 
 60. FEIN ET AL., supra note 47, at 41. 
 61. David J. Fein, Married and Poor: Basic Characteristics of Economically 
Disadvantaged Married Couples in the U.S. 9, 11 (MDRC, Working Paper No. SHM-01 2004), 
available at http://www.supportinghealthymarriage.org/publications/6/workpaper.pdf. 
 62. M. ROBIN DION ET AL., MATHEMATICA POLICY RESEARCH, INC., IMPLEMENTING 
HEALTHY MARRIAGE PROGRAMS FOR UNMARRIED COUPLES WITH CHILDREN: EARLY LESSONS 
FROM THE BUILDING STRONG FAMILIES PROJECT 67 (2006), available at http://www.acf. 
hhs.gov/programs/opre/strengthen/build_fam/reports/implementing_healthy/implementinghealt
hy.pdf. 
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minorities. Researchers and policymakers must distinguish between 
low-income couples, who are as likely to marry as others, and various 
racial minority couples, who tend to marry at lower rates.63 On the 
other hand, this lower rate of marriage for some racial minorities, and 
same-sex couples’ current legal inability to marry, means that the 
diversion of funding from direct anti-poverty relief to marriage 
promotion disproportionately diverts welfare funding away from 
impoverished racial and sexual-orientation minorities.64 Policy 
analysts and social science researchers must consider both the 
practical and potential constitutional implications of these 
disproportionate effects.65 
CONCLUSION 
As with the earlier political consensus supporting a requirement of 
work in exchange for welfare, policymakers and researchers recently 
have coalesced in support of promoting marriage for disadvantaged 
couples. This new consensus has generated a second wave of 
research funding for social science researchers who study 
impoverished families. While this popular bandwagon may be tainted 
by unfounded assumptions and myths about marriage and poverty, 
the goal now must be to study the major lessons and complex 
nuances emerging from the data. The data thus far makes clear that 
marriage is only one among the many choices and factors influencing 
the family lives of poor people, and that little is understood about the 
 
 63. Fein, supra note 61, at 12. 
 64. Laura Wherry & Kenneth Finegold, Marriage Promotion and the Living 
Arrangements of Black, Hispanic, and White Children, URB. INST. SERIES B, NO. B-61, Sept. 
2004, at 1, 6, available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/311064_B-61.pdf.  
 65. For policy implications, see id. and SEAN CAHILL & KENNETH T. JONES, POLICY INST. 
OF NAT’L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE, LEAVING OUR CHILDREN BEHIND: WELFARE REFORM 
AND THE GAY, LESBIAN, BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER COMMUNITY (2001), available at 
http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/fact_sheets/WelfarefactSheet/pdf. Regarding 
constitutional implications, while courts typically review governmental programs 
discriminating based on race under strict scrutiny, the Supreme Court rejected strict scrutiny 
review and upheld the funding of various public benefits programs against a challenge based on 
statistical evidence showing disproportionate racial impact in Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 
535 (1972). The courts have not yet held that sexual orientation minorities constitute a suspect 
class or that sexual orientation is a suspect classification, and therefore courts typically apply 
rational basis review and uphold governmental discrimination based on sexual orientation. 
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role of marriage among the many other challenges and barriers 
confronting impoverished families.  
Structuring families around heterosexual marriage is an end in 
itself for some. For the evaluation of welfare policy, however, the 
eyes must remain on the prize: whether marriage promotion reduces 
poverty and increases the well-being of disadvantaged families. 
Failure to evaluate the marriage promotion experiments based on 
whether they decrease poverty effectively reduces welfare recipients 
to mere social science guinea pigs, a phenomenon that is 
constitutionally allowed precisely because of their class. 
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